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COMMENTS
PURCHASE-MONEY MORTGAGES IN PENNSYLVANIA
The priority of purchase-money mortgages is settled law in Pennsyl-
vania.' However, it is submitted that the determination of which
mortgages fall within this protected class is not settled. The unre-
solved issue is whether purchase-money mortgages are limited to
the vendor-vendee relationship or whether they extend to mortgages
given directly to a third party as part of the same transaction in
which the deed was delivered.
For example: B Buyer wishes to purchase property from S Seller.
However, Buyer does not possess adequate capital to meet the pur-
chase price. In an attempt to acquire the necessary funds Buyer
visits the Friendly Finance Company. The officers agree to loan the
money in return for a mortgage on the property. Simultaneously,
Seller deeds the property to Buyer, Buyer executes a mortgage to the
finance company and the finance company pays Seller the purchase
price. During the interim between the execution of the deed and
mortgage and the recording of the mortgage a valid judgment was
rendered and properly recorded against Buyer.
Does this judgment lien take priority over the mortgage or is the
mortgage a purchase-money mortgage and thereby prior to the lien
by operation of law?
In illustrating the question and a possible answer, this comment
will primarily concern itself with the Acts of 1820, 1915, 1927, and
1951 of the Pennsylvania Legislature and the cases decided there-
under.
The Act of 18202 provided that all mortgages should -have priority
according to the date of recording. However, § 1 of the act .created -an
exception by providing:
That no mortgage given for the purchase money of the land
so mortgaged, shall be affected by the passage of this act,
if the same be recorded within sixty days from the execu-
tion thereof. 3
1. Cake's Appeal, 23 Pa. 186 (1854); In re Deardorff, 17 F.2d 294 (1927);
Parke v. Neeley, 90 Pa. 52 (1879); Case's Petition 27 Pa. D.&C. 391 (1936).
2. Act of 1820, March 28, P.L. 144.
3. 14. atJ, 1.
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Under this act the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded:
A purchase-money mortgage, however, may not always
be in the name of the vendor, he may assign his right, and
the security be taken in the name of the vendor, for the use
of the assignee, or indeed, it may, under the operation of an
assignment, legal or equitable, be taken in the name of an-
other. It can only, however, be in the name of another by the
act or deed of the vendor as no other than the vendor, or
those representing him, can have title to purchase money as
such. 4
In a later case 5 a more liberal view was taken. Mr. Justice Green
in his opinion agreed entirely with the learned court below in holding
that where the purchaser gave at the same time with the deed a
mortgage to secure the purchase money, although to one other than
the vendor, the mortgagee was entitled to his lien for a purchase-
money mortgage. The test is not whether the mortgage is given to
the vendor for the purchase money, but whether it is to be used as
purchase money.6
In answer to the contention that the act limited purchase-money
mortgages to those given the vendor the court held that while the
act probably contemplated cases where the mortgage was given to
the seller of land, the words of the act were not restricted to such
cases and its application to a third party would be a just and fair
construction. 7
Under the Act of 1820 the law became well settled that a third
party could be a purchase-money mortgagee as well as the vendor,8
provided all the acts of the parties appeared to be parts of a single
transaction9 and in its legal effect it was the same as though the
4. Albright v. Lafayette Bldg. & Say. Ass'n, 102 Pa. 411, 417 (1883). Here
the court concluded it was not necessary that a purchase-money mortgage be
given to the seller, but rather could be executed to any nominee to whom the
vendor assigned his right. At this point the court still required an affirmative
act by the vendor whereby he assigned his right to receive the purchase money
when delivered by the purchaser. See also Jeanes v. Hizer, 186 Pa. 523, 40 At.
785 (1898); Citizens' Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Mount Pleasant v. Arvin, 207 Pa.
293, 56 Atl. 870 (1904); Hiser v. Hlser, 13 Montg. 49 (Pa. Com. P1. 1896).
5. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ellis, 192 Pa. 321, 43 At. 1034
(1879); Appeal of Campbell, 36 Pa. 247 (1860).
6. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ellis, supra note 5.
7. Id. at 324, 43 At. at 1035.
8. Albright v. Lafayette Bldg. & Say. Ass'n., supra note 4.
9. Lafayette Bldg. & Sav. Loan Ass'n. v. Erb, 5 Sadler 401 (Pa. 1887), 8
AU. 62 (1887). Here the mortgage was dated three days after the deed, but de-




purchaser had executed a mortgage to the vendor for the purchase
money and he had assigned it to the party advancing the money. 1 0
In 1915 the legislature amended the Act of 1820 by an act entitled:
An act ... requiring purchase-money mortgages to be re-
corded within thirty days in order to have priority of lien.1
The amended section concerning purchase-money mortgages pro-
vided:
No mortgage given by purchaser to seller, for any part of
the purchase money of the land so mortgaged, shall be
affected by the passage of this act if the same be recorded
within thirty days from the execution thereof.1 2 (Emphasis
Supplied.)
The 1915 amendment to the 1820 Act not only reduced the grace
period from 60 to 30 days but also indicated the legislature's agree-
ment with the court in Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ellis1 3
and expressly limited purchase-money mortgages to the seller-pur-
chaser relationship.
In Moore v. Oyer,14 a lower court decision, Judge Stewart stated:
We have carefully read the authorities cited to us upon the
subject of purchase-money mortgages prior to the passage
of the Act of 28th of May, 1915, P.L. 631 .... Two changes
were made by the amending act. The mortgage referred to
must be given by purchaser to seller, and secondly, the time
of recording was reduced from sixty to thirty days. 1 5 (Em-
phasis Supplied.)
Judge Stewart then concluded that only one of the mortgages
claiming priority of lien could be a purchase-money mortgage and
senior to the other two because, as required by the Act of 1915, it
was the only mortgage given to the vendor of the property.
The court in Case's Petition1 6 reviewed the Acts of 1820 and 1915
and concluded its analysis by holding:
This [The Act of 1915] would appear to limit the benefit
of the common-law rule to cases where the mortgage was
10. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ellis, supra note 5; Appeal of
Campbell, supra note 5; Jones, Mortgages § 586 (8th ed. 1928).
11. Act of 1915, May 28, PJL. 631.
12. Id. at § 1.
13. Supra note 5.
14. 21 North. 345 (Pa. Com. P1. 1928).
15. Id. at 350-51.
16. 27 Pa. D.&C. 391 (1936).
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igiven by the purchaser to the seller. This limitation exists
by .statute in Maryland .and Ohio: 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law
467.17 (Emphasis Supplied.)
Martin's Estate, a superior court decision, was the first case in
which this question was given appellate review.' 8 The two mort-
gages in issue were executed in 1924. However, neither was given to
the vendor of the property. Mr. Justice Rhodes, speaking for the
court held neither to have the priority of a purchase-money mort-
gage:
[A] lthough .they may have been given for -purchase-money,
[neither] was protected by the Act ,of May 28, 1915, P.L.
631 § .1, because they were not given by purchaser to seller. 19
(Emphasis Supplied.)
It is important to note that the court did not conclude that the
two mortgages were not purchase-money mortgages but rather that
they were not protected by the lien priority provisions of the Act of
1915.
Twelve years after the Act of 1915 became effective the Act of
192720 was approved by the legislature. The act was entitled:
[An act] ... protecting the lien of mortgages by purchasers
to sellers, if recorded -within thirty days -from the date of
-suchmortgage.2 1 (Emphasis Supplied.)
17. Id..at 396. The courts of Maryland and Ohio in construing ambiguous
statutes held that only between the vendor and purchaser could a purchase-
money mortgage exist. Heuisler v. "Nickum, '38 Md. 270 (1873); Stansell v.
Roberts, 13 Ohio 148 (1844). The rationale being that as between the purchaser
and .a third party, money advanced is simply borrowed money and third parties
are not in privity to the transaction of purchase and sale.
Section 4 of article 66 of the Maryland Code Annot. provides:
Whenever lands... are sold and conveyed and a mortgage...
is -given by the ,purchaser at the same time to secure the pay-
ment.of the purchase money .... such mortgage . .. shall be
preferred to any previous judgment . .. which may have been
obtained against such purchaser ...
The court in Heuisler v. Nickum concluded that the statute was sus-
ceptible of two constructions, one including anyone the purchaser may choose
to mortgage his interest in the land but "Such a construction Is decidedly against
the tenor of our decisions." Here just as in the Ohio case the court construed the
statute in light of prior decisional law.
18. 135 Pa. Super. 136, 4 A.2d 551 (.1939).
19. Id. at 142, 4 A.2d at 554-55.




Section. 1 of the, act provided:
Any mortgage, given by purchaser to seller, for any part of;
the purchase money of the land so mortgaged, shall. have a
lien from, the time of delivery of said mortgage% provided the
same be recorded within thirty days from the time of: the,
mortgage. 2 2 (Emphasis Supplied.)
The 1927 Act repealed the Act of 1820 and the 1915 amendment.
The only change effected by the passage of this act was to provide
that the lien. of purchase-money mortgages became effective as of
the date of delivery rather than the date of the mortgage's execu-
tion. 2 3
The- Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not receive an opportunity
to review the third party purchase mortgage issue until 1931 in
Oransky v. Stepanavich.2 4
Here the plaintiffs, a married couple, desired to purchase defend-
ant's property but lacked the funds. A bank agreed to. loan them the
money in. return for a promissory note provided the defendant-seller
acted as surety. The property was deeded to plaintiffs as tenants by
the entireties. Upon default the defendant, as surety, was forced to
pay the balance of the note. He then received an assignment of the
note- from the bank and levied on the property. The defendant then
bought-in the property at a sheriff's sale. The plaintiff-wife filed a
petition repudiating any obligation on the note alleging that at the
time the note was executed she was a minor. She further contended
that by her repudiation of the note the obligation became. the sole
debt of her husband and that property held. by the entireties. could
not be. levied upon for the sole obligation of one spouse.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, quoting from Kennedy, v.
Baker2 5 said:
'Where an infant executes a purchase-money mortgage to
secure the purchase money for land conveyed to him by deed,
he cannot after he comes of age affirm the deed and at the
same time disaffirm the mortgage.' As we have already
pointed out, there is no distinction between a purchase-
money mortgage and a purchase-money judgment. 2 6 (Em-
phasis Supplied.)
22. Supra note 20 at §2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 662.
23. The act also provided procedural. rules, for, the, Recorder of Deeds; how-
everi, there was no effect on. the limited relationshipi placed. on purchase-money
mortgages and the seller-purchaser restriction was continued.
24. 804 Pa. 84, 155 A. 290 (1931).
25. 159 Pa. 146, 28 AU. 252 (1893).
26. Supra note 24 at 91, 155 A. at 292.
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The court subsequently concluded that the note executed by the
plaintiff was a purchase-money obligation by providing:
In Com. Title Ins. & Trust Co. v Ellis, 192 Pa. 321, 327, we
said: 'The delivery of the deed to the mortgagor and of the
mortgage to the mortgagee were concurrent and simultane-
ous acts, and the money for which the mortgage was given
was in actual fact a part of the purchase money paid for the
property, at the very time of the delivery of the deed.' 27
Nowhere in the opinion did the court attempt to construe the pro-
visions of the Act of 1927 which provided purchase-money mortgages
were to be from the purchaser to the seller. The court derived its
definition of purchase-money mortgages from the decisional law
handed down prior to the Acts of 1915 and 1927.
The supreme court was given a second opportunity to determine
the construction to be given § 1 of the Act of 1927.2 8 The fact situa-
tion was practically indentical to the prior case except the wife as-
serted the incompetence of her husband at the time the bond and
mortgage were executed rather than infancy as in the Oransky29
case. The court held the mortgage to be a purchase-money mortgage
notwithstanding the defense of incompetency of the husband and the
fact the property was held by the entireties. In so holding the court
cited Oransky v. Stepanavich3o and Commonwealth Title Ins. &
Trust Co. v. Ellis,3 1 both of which were decided in light of the law
prevailing under the Act of 1820.
The supreme court in both these cases based its opinion on case
law decided under the Act of 1820 which contained no definition of
purchase-money mortgages. Under the Act of 1820, as hereinbefore
stated, the court concluded that the act probably contemplated cases
where the mortgage was given to the seller of land. However, it fur-
ther concluded that the words were not restricted to such cases;
therefore, its application to a third party would be a just and fair
construction.
In 1915 and 1927 the Pennsylvania legislature altered the law con-
cerning purchase-money mortgages by embodying the words "pur-
chaser to seller" in the acts and thereby qualified purchase-money
mortgages. The subsequent cases decided under the two acts con-
cluded that the words "purchaser to seller" restricted the purchase-
27. Supra note 24 at 90, 155 AtI. at 292.
28. General Casinir Pulaski Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Provident Trust Co. of
Philadelphia, 338 Pa. 198, 12 A.2d 336 (1940).
29. Supra note 24.
30. bid.
31. Supra note 5.
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money mortgage protected by the acts to those given to the vendor.
However, the supreme court in the Oransky3 2 and General Casmir
Pulaski Bldg. & Loan Ass'n.3 3 cases failed to refer to the Act of 1927.
The court refused to interpret the definition presented by the act and
failed to explain its applicability or lack of applicability to the two
cases.
It is possible that the court did not believe the two cases squarely
met the issue as to whether a purchase-money mortgage can be given
to a third party under the Act of 1927. However, the two cases do
aid in the development of a line of decisions which could be inter-
preted as consistent, and if so interpreted, may indicate the manner
in which the supreme court will resolve this issue.
It is important to note that in both these cases the issue did not
concern a conflict over priority of lien but rather, whether or not the
obligation could be considered a purchase-money obligation in order
to prevent the unjust enrichment of a party. In Martin's Estate,3 4
the superior court did not say that the mortgages given the third
party were not purchase-money mortgages but rather that they did
not fall within the protection offered by the thirty day grace period
for recording of such liens.
The last statutory enactment in this area was the LIEN PRIORITY
LAw of 1951. [35] Section 2 of the act provides:
Liens against real property shall have priority over each
other on the following basis:
(1) Purchase-money mortgages, from the time they are de-
livered to the mortgagee, if they are recorded within thirty
days after their date; otherwise, from the time they are left
for record. 3 6 (Emphasis Supplied.)
The Act of 1927 provided that any mortgage, given by purchaser
to seller for purchase money would have a lien as of delivery if re-
corded within thirty days. 3 7
Thus, the Act of 1951 uses the word mortgagee rather than seller
as used in the Act of 1927. It has been indicated that this substitu-
tion of the word mortgagee for seller is at least a stronger reason for
contending that the test is not whether the mortgage is given to the
32. Supra note 24.
33. Supra note 28.
34. St pra note 18.
35. Act of 1951, June 28, P.L. 927, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 602.
36. Id. at § 2; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 602.
37. Act of 1927, April 27, P.L. 440, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 662.
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vendor but. whether it is given for purchase money.3 8 It is impor-
tant to. note: that the LIEN PRIORITY LAW3 9 of 1951 repealed the 1927
act only insofar as the latter is inconsistent with and supplied by
the former, which contains no definition of a purchase-money mort-
gage. 4f0 The primary purpose of the 1951 Act is clearly indicated
by the title which provides:
An act giving liens against real property priority over each
other in point of time; fixing the time from which priorities
extend; and imposing duties on the judges and certain courts
and county officers and employes [sic].41
The basis for the statute was not to change the requirements for
the lien but rather to alter the priority of the liens. The act set
forth a uniform system of lien priority but in no manner altered nor
does the title indicate it was intended to alter the prior requirements
necessary to qualify one as a holder of any lien against real property.
It would seem the 1927 Act remained in force, at least in that re-
spect, since the definition of a purchase-money mortgage is neither
inconsistent with nor supplied by the Act of 1951. Therefore, the
question whether under the 1927 Act, a purchase-money mortgage
could be given to a third party still exists under the 1951 Act, since
it made no change in that respect.
It is submitted that the supreme court may separate purchase-
money mortgages into two classes, one with priority of lien from de-
livery if recorded within thirty days of the date thereon, and a sec-
ond class with priority only from the date of recording. The former
would necessarily be given to the vendor and the latter to a third
party. It may seem that the second class would not be a purchase-
money mortgage because it conflicts with the very nature of a pur-
chase-money mortgage. If this distinction is not drawn, inequitable
results would necessarily follow from situations such as are present
ih the Oransky42 and General Casmir Pulaski Bldg. & Loan Assn.43
cases. The development of these two classes of purchase-money mort-
gages would resolve the ostensible inconsistency between the lower
38.. 12.U. OF Prrr. L. REV. 148 (1951).
39. Act of 1951, June 28, P.L. 927, § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 601.
"[T]he Act of 1951 repealed section 622 of Title 21, Deeds and
Mortgages, in so far as It Is inconsistent with or supplied, by
this act . .. "1
40. 36 Am. Jur., Mortgages § 229. Purchase-money mortgages are defined
as being "entitled to a preference as such over all other claims or liens arising
through the mortgagor although they are prior in point of time."
41. Supra note 35.
42. Supra note 24.
43. Supra note 28.
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court cases and the supreme court cases. However, it is possible that
the supreme court may follow the great majority of courts that have
extended the benefits of the purchase-money mortgage beyond the
vendor to the third party.4 4 Regardless of which analysis the court
accepts as controlling in Pennsylvania, "wisdom [should] dictate the
advisability of having a purchase-money mortgage executed directly
to the grantor and the mortgage itself assigned by him to the ulti-
mate holder. '45
44. In re Sandler v. Freeny, 120 F.2d 881 (1941); Gautney v. Gautney, 253
Ala. 584, 46 So.2d 198 (1950); Faulkner County Bank & Trust Co. v. Vail, 173
Ark. 406, 293 S.W. 40 (1927); Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Bank of Lenox,
192 Ga. 543, 16 S.E. 2d 9 (1941); Wermes v. McCowan, 286 Ill. App. 381, 3 N.E.
2d 720 (1936); In re Lewis' Estate, 230 Iowa 694, 298 N.W. 842 (1941); Hill v.
Hill, 185 Kan. 389, 345 P.2d 1015 (1959); O'Halloran v. Marriage, 167 Minn. 443,
209 N.W. 271 (1926); Syracuse Say. Loan Ass'n. v. Hass, 234 N.Y.S. 514, 134
Misc. 82 (1929); Smith Builders Supply, Inc. v. Rivenbark, 231 N.C. 213, 56 S.E.
2d 431 (1949); Ladd & Tilton Bank v. Mitchell, 93 Or. 668, 184 Pac. 282 (1919);
Beck v. Elliott, 53 S.D. 138, 220 N.W. 448 (1928); Butler v. Thornburgh, 131 Ind.
237, 40 N.E. 514 (1895); Price v. Davis, 15 Ky. L. 120, 22 S.W. 316 (1893); Clark
v. Munroe, 14 Mass. 350 (1817); Pearl v. Hervey, 70 Mo. 160 (1879); Adams v.
Hill, 29 N.H. 202 (1854); New Jersey Bldg., Loan & Inv. Co. v. Bachelor, 54 N.J.
Eq. 600, 35 Atl. 745 (1896); Cowardin v. Anderson, 78 Va. 88 (1883); Carey v.
Boyle, 53 Wisc. 574, 11 N.W. 47 (1881).
45. LADNER ON CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA § 9:33 (3rd ed. 1961).
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